Introduction
With China's investment and saving high-in historical context and compared to other countries-questions on investment and saving continue to arouse the interest of policymakers and researchers. However, knowledge about the underlying patterns of investment and saving is limited. This paper attempts to answer the following questions. What are the factors driving China's high investment? How is saving channeled into investment? In particular, how is enterprise investment financed, and what are the roles of the domestic banking sector, enterprise saving, and the government?
Answers to these questions are important for several reasons. First, they inform the current debate on the types of risks and policy challenges stemming from China's high investment, including on what policies are needed to mitigate risks and improve the efficiency of capital allocation. Second, they facilitate the understanding of China's pattern of growth. High investment and saving are key features of China's pattern of growth. A better understanding of their determinants could improve the understanding of the pattern of growth; its sustainability; and medium and long-term prospects. Third, they help identify the policy implications of the projected saving and investment developments, also in light of identified tensions and the intended change in the policy stance, including the planned shift in government spending from investment to social spending and the increased role of private consumption.
To answer these questions, the paper analyzes sectoral trends in investment and saving and the resulting sectoral saving-investment balances over time and relates them to cyclical and structural developments, to better interpret current developments. It also compares these trends to those in other countries to identify China's special features.
The paper uses-apparently for the first time-time series data from the Flow of Funds (FoF) from the national accounts. 1 The advantage of these data is that they reflect financial flows between sectors. Moreover, the "above the line" flow data are mapped with "below the line" data on financing. The conclusions based on this data are verified by looking at data from other sources, including from the financial sector, on the financing of investment from the Statistical Yearbook (SYB), and the household survey. 2 This paper does not look into potential problems with data on investment and GDP, reflecting a belief that, in addition to any data problems-most of which are pertinent in other countries too-there are economic explanations behind the developments on investment and saving in China.
We find that since the early 1990s investment by households and direct investment by the government have been relatively steady at levels comparable to other countries, while investment by the enterprise sector distinguishes China from other countries and explains most of the variation of China's total investment over time. We also find that high household saving explains only part of the difference in total saving between China and other countries; the rest is explained by high saving of the government and enterprises, the latter particularly in recent years, as profitability has improved. Net external financing of enterprise investment-from the banking sector and via net foreign direct investment (FDI)-is high compared to other countries but, at about one-third, constitutes only a modest part of enterprise investment.
High government saving is the result of a policy favoring government-financed investment over government consumption. Reasons for relatively high saving by enterprises include a high share of capital-intensive industry in GDP and a traditional policy of low (or no) dividends.
These findings lead to three sets of policy implications. First, the financing patterns indicate a lower degree of bank financing to enterprises and associated financial sector exposure than is usually thought. By the same token, though, against the background of concerns about suboptimal allocation of capital, the high degree of financing by retained earnings and government transfers bring to the fore issues of (corporate) governance and dividend policy, as well as of transparency and accountability of public funds. Second, the planned shift in government spending from investment toward social spending and the increased role of private consumption can be brought about by reducing the high share of government revenue traditionally devoted to investment and changing the policy framework away from the promotion of capital-intensive industry. Third, saving is projected to decline in the long term, with the speed depending on policy adjustments.
A. Findings in existing literature about saving in China
Domestic saving finances the bulk of any country's investment. Questions about levels of investment are therefore closely linked to questions on saving. The theoretical literature on the determinants of saving is rooted in consumption theory and, consequently, largely centers on factors affecting households. Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000) provide an overview of empirical studies in this area in developed and developing countries. Their own cross country empirical work finds that private sector and national savings are affected by:
• The level of development (per capita income), with the influence of per capita income larger in developing countries; • Economic growth, with much of the causation running from growth to saving; • Fiscal policy, with its impact on national savings typically only partly offset by responses in private saving;
However, as this is only available on an annual basis, FAI data is used regularly. Although the data used in this paper is on GCF, there may still be issues in international comparisons. In addition, China's GDP data is often considered to be underestimated, due to the limited capture of rapidly developing sectors, although this is true for many countries.
• Pension reform, with direct short-term effects depending on the financing of the transition deficits and long term effects likely dominated by labor market effects; • Financial liberalization, with the impact on saving of interest liberalization mixed, but a strong effect from expanding the supply of credit to people that had been credit-constrained; and • Demographics, with an increase in the share of young or elderly dependents in the population tending to reduce private saving-by 1 percentage point (pp) for a 3.5 percentage point increase in the young age dependency ratio, and 2 pp for a similar increase in the old age dependency ratio; as well as by external borrowing and foreign aid, and uncertainty.
China's national saving rate is high relative to international experience, even after controlling for these determinants of saving. Kraay (2000) found, based on a crosscountry regression using the above set of variables, that China's high national saving rate-on average 37 percent between 1978 and 1995, compared to an international average of almost 21 percent-can be partly explained by high growth and, to a lesser extent, favorable demographics. However, China's national saving rate was 10 percentage points higher than what would be expected based on China's characteristics.
The increase in China's household saving ratio to a high level is well-documented, and largely explained. Kraay (2000) presents data on saving based on the household survey and on wealth data. He notes that prior to the reforms, high saving "were engineered by state fiat", via administered relative prices that ensured high profits in state-owned enterprises, which then could be directed to the state's investment priorities. Household saving were low in the pre-reform area. Subsequent to the reform, public saving has diminished, whereas rising household incomes have made household saving newly prominent, "with households contributing between a quarter and half of total saving." 4 Modigliani and Cao (2004) attribute China's high household saving to increases in growth and changing demographics. Their saving data is constructed from changes in personal wealth using asset data. 5, 6 Their (single country, time series) empirical analysis suggests that household saving has risen due to (i) the economic reforms since the end1970s, and the increase in growth and growth prospects they generated; as well as (ii) the introduction of the one-child policy at around the same time, which led to a gradual increase in the ratio of employment to total population and undermined the traditional 4 Such observations on the relative importance of household saving, and the implied saving by enterprises and the government, do not seem to have featured in most subsequent discussions on saving in China. 5 They test the validity of the life cycle hypothesis (LCH) of saving on China. The LCH stresses intertemporal considerations in saving decisions. It asserts that the saving rate largely depends on economic growth (and growth prospects) and the demographic structure of a country (in particular, the relation between the working and the non-working population), rather than the level of income. 6 Using data from the SYB, they calculate saving as: the change in (currency + deposits) + new issuance of bonds + individual investment in fixed assets. Their data indicates that the household saving rate was very low (around 5 percent) until the reforms started in 1978. The household saving rate subsequently rose rapidly, peaking at over 33 percent in 1994, after which it declined gradually to 24 percent in 2000.
role of the family in providing old-age support. 7 They also note that the very low saving rate prior to1978 calls into question "cultural" explanations of China's high saving rate.
As elaborated in this paper, analysis of sectoral data explains why the consensus set of factors discussed above-largely centered on households-cannot fully explain China's high national saving ratio, even though the level and movement of China's household saving ratio can largely be explained. This is because most of the difference in national saving rate between China and other countries is explained by saving outside the household sector: by enterprises and the government (see text table). The paper adds to the existing literature by exploring the sectoral patterns, focusing on the patterns of enterprise and government saving. 
B. Investment and Saving (1990-2003)

Investment
Investment has been high throughout this period, with household and government investment stable at rates comparable to other countries. Enterprise investment, ranging between 27 and 35 percent of GDP, makes China's investment high.
Since the mid-1980s, (total) investment in China has been high. 8 As a share of GDP, it peaked at 43.3 percent of GDP in 1993 during the height of the previous economic cycle (Table 1 and Figure 1 ). The cyclical slowdown in investment thereafter was moderate, with the investment to GDP ratio reaching a low of 36.3 percent in 2000 (1999 was the trough of the cycle in terms of GDP growth). Since then, the ratio increased to 43.8 percent of GDP in 2003 and is estimated to have grown to an even higher share in 2004.
Up until the end of the 1990s investment in inventories was substantial. According to the national accounts, it reached a remarkable 10 percent of GDP in 1989, and declined gradually thereafter. In addition to possibly indicating data problems, these data indicate the build up of inventories produced in the absence of market economy signals. To the extent that the decomposition of investment-in fixed investment and change in inventories-has been meaningful for the whole data period, gross fixed investment has been subject to a trend increase since the early 1990s ( Figure 1 ).
Investment by households and (direct) investment by the government has been relatively steady at levels comparable to other countries. Investment by households, largely residential, has been 5-6 percent of GDP since the early 1990s; in recent years it has been increasing, to an estimated 6.7 percent in 2003 (and further in 2004) (Figure 2, upper panel) . Since the early 1990s, investment by the government has been around 3-4 percent of GDP. As shown below (see Table 2 ), household and government investment are in the range found for other countries.
Investment by the enterprise sector distinguishes China from other countries, and explains most of the cyclical variation in investment. Enterprise capital formation reached a peak of 35.5 percent of GDP in 1993, at the height of the previous cycle. As a ratio of GDP it declined thereafter, to a low of 27.3 percent of GDP in 2000. During the recent cyclical upturn it increased to an estimated 33.8 percent of GDP in 2003.
Source: NBS, and staff estimates. 
Saving and saving-investment balances
With China's national saving-investment balance (the current account) typically roughly in balance, domestic saving are the predominant financing source of investment. High household saving is only part of the story behind high total saving; the other part is the remarkably high government saving and rising enterprise saving.
Households in China contribute significantly to national saving. The household saving rate (as a share of household disposable income) has been around 25 percent since 2000, having declined from around 30 percent in the mid-1990s.
Data on saving rates can also be obtained from the household survey data. 9 Our calculations indicate that the saving rate derived from the household survey and from the FoF tables are broadly consistent for recent years (Figure 3 ), running at around 25 percent.
10,11 However, for the period prior to 2000, when the household survey was conducted using a different methodology, it is not consistent. In particular, prior to the mid-1990s, the overall saving rate implied by the household survey was significantly lower than that implied by the FoF data. On the other hand, the overall household saving ratio based on the FoF data is quite close to the data derived by Modigliani and Cao (2004) .
Household saving were 16 percent of GDP in 2001, and are estimated to have increased slightly since then (as a ratio of GDP) (Figure 2 , middle panel). The balance between saving and investment is in principle available as net financial investment.
12 This balance came down from 14-16 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s to around 10 percent of GDP in 2000-01 (Figure 2 , lower panel). Based on financial assets data, it is estimated to have increased to almost 14 percent in 2002. 13 The bulk (over 90 percent) of households' net financial investment is in bank saving deposits.
Government saving is remarkably high compared to other countries, and is much higher than suggested by the headline fiscal data. It reached 7.5 percent of GDP in 2001 (it is assumed to have remained roughly at that level in 2002-03). As a result, the government runs a significant saving-investment surplus, which forms an additional financing source. Indeed, in addition to its own investment, the government finances investment via capital transfers to state-owned enterprises in the power, electricity, water, transport, and Based on the above data, China's financial system has been rather effective in channeling financial resources to enterprise investment-an important factor behind China's remarkable growth experience, and in contrast to most developing countries, where banks' assets largely comprise government bonds. In this context, a judgment on the economic efficiency of China's financial system would be more favorable than the more common judgment on financial efficiency.
A closer look at financing of non-financial enterprise investment
Investment of non-financial enterprises is financed mainly through four sources: own savings, government capital transfers, and bank loans and FDI.
Own saving from retained earnings of non-financial enterprises has increased from around 12.5 percent of GDP in 1996 to almost 15 percent in 2001 and an estimated 18 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 14 In addition to cyclical factors, the increase in profitability is underscored by retrenchment and restructuring of SOEs. First, the importance of private companies has increased. Private companies tend to be more profitable, in the same industry. The share of SOEs and collectively-owned companies in total investment has declined from around 80 percent in the early 1990s to 53 15 According to the FoF accounts, this is also true for financing via the banking sector (Text table below 14 Based on the estimations using the national accounts. 15 According to the NBS SYB (Table 6. 3), the share of total investment (all sectors) funded by domestic loans rose until the early 1990s. It peaked at 27 percent in 1992. Since 1995 it has been around 20 percent. Financial flows derived from the financial sector statistics (FSS) largely confirm these conclusions. Analysis of the FSS is complicated by methodological changes and, especially in recent years, recapitalization operations. Moreover, the FSS includes lending to households (until very recently this was not distinguished from lending to enterprises). 16 According to the (adjusted) FSS data, net bank financing to the nonfinancial sector peaked in 2003 at 13.4 percent of GDP, and was 8 percent in 2004 (see Text table above). Given that credit to households has increased rapidly in recent years, the FSS data do also suggest that net bank financing has been a modest share of enterprise investment in recent years.
C. Investment and Saving in International Comparison
To put the data on saving and investment in international perspective, it is compared with data for the US, France, Japan, Korea, and Mexico (Table 2) . 17 Total domestic saving was 16 percentage points of GDP higher in China than in the average of these five countries in 2001. This difference is estimated to have increased to 20 percent in 2003.
Households
Household saving is substantially higher than in the comparator countries. The household saving rate of around 25 percent compares to 16 percent in France, the second highest.
18
Household disposable income is, surprisingly, not much lower than in France and Japan, as a share of GDP, and even higher than in Korea, although it is much lower than in the US and Mexico. That means that household saving is also relatively high as a ratio of GDP. High household saving typically explains less than one-half of the difference in enterprise sector investment between China and the other countries.
Household capital formation-predominantly residential investment-is at 6.7 percent of GDP in 2003 comparable in size to that in other countries. As a result, the differences in household gross saving rates are largely reflected in differences in net lending of the sector.
Enterprises
Gross operating surpluses-the source of retained earnings-in China are comparable to those in Japan, but some 9-10 percentage point of GDP higher than in the US, France, and Mexico. Reasons behind these differences include differences in economic structure and dividend policies. 16 Historically roughly comparable, in 2002 banking system net financing of the private sector according to the FSS was significantly higher than banking system net financing of the enterprise sector according to the FoF. Attempts to adjust the FSS credit data for the structural breaks reduce the gap, but it remains sizeable. Interestingly, the accumulated financing during 2001 and 2002 is similar. 17 The comparison is unfortunately restricted to OECD countries, given the large difficulties obtaining the required data for other countries. 18 Household saving rates in the US and Japan used to be much higher than they have been recently. A key factor behind China's high national and enterprise saving is the large relative size of China's industry. Investment tends to be higher in industry than in other sectors, due to the inherent capital intensity of the processes, which also implies a higher share of value added distributed to capital. These relatively high earnings in industry-if retained-are the core of enterprise saving. Empirical evidence across countries confirms that the investment to GDP ratio tends to be higher in countries with a high share of industry in value added (Figure 5 ). Within the sample of Figure 5 , China has by far the highest shares on both dimensions. In other words, China's very high investment to GDP ratio is consistent with the importance of industry in the economy. 19 Another key factor is that Chinese companies pay out relatively low dividends. In particular, the SOE sector pays only limited dividends to the shareholder, and non to the state (to which it pays only taxes), although the increase in profitability in recent years has stimulated a policy discussion on the distribution of profits.
Significant capital transfers to enterprises by the government-6.2 percent of GDP in 2001, and assumed to have remained at roughly that level in 2002-03-are a unique Table 2 ).
Government
In terms of government revenues as a share of GDP, China is positioned between the US, Japan, and Mexico on the one hand and France and Korea on the other. Government consumption is relatively low in China, particularly compared to France. While there is little difference in direct government investment, large capital transfers to-stateowned-enterprises distinguish China from the other countries. These transfers mean that government saving and government-financed investment (broadly defined) are substantially higher than is suggested by the headline fiscal data.
D. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The above analysis has revealed the following points:
• Although discussions on investment and saving traditionally focus on household saving, China's high saving rate is as much driven by high saving of enterprises and the government as by high household saving.
• Investment by households and direct investment by the government has been relatively steady at levels comparable to other countries (around 7 and 3-4 percent of GDP, respectively).
• Investment by the enterprise sector distinguishes China from other countries, and shows most of the variation over time. In recent years, the differential ranged between 11 (Korea) and 20 (US) percentage points of GDP.
• High enterprise investment is financed partly by a large excess of saving over investment of households-channeled by the banking system-and the government-transferred to enterprises.
• But with enterprise own saving having risen as profitability has improved, over one-half is financed by enterprise retained earnings.
• High government saving is a result of a policy favoring government-financed investment over government consumption.
• Reasons for relatively high saving by enterprises include a high share of capital intensive industry in GDP and dividend policies.
These findings lead to three sets of policy-related issues:
1) Financing patterns, and their policy implications
Systemic risks to the banking sector stemming from China's high investment appear to be smaller than suggested by many observers. It is likely that a significant share of the recent investment is misallocated and some bank-funded investment will never generate the rates of return required to avoid new NPLs. It is also likely that this has significant implications for China's banking system. However, as demonstrated in this paper, the exposure of the banking system to the investment boom is much less than implied by the overall investment numbers, and less than at the height of the previous investment cycle-with net external financing including net FDI financing about 30 percent of enterprise investment, compared to 40-60 percent in 1992-96.
By the same token, high and increasing financing of enterprise investment through retained earnings poses its own risks and policy challenges.
• Large-scale re-channeling of profits back in investment by firms makes investment more pro-cyclical and prone to "boom and bust cycles".
• Relatedly, the allocation of capital does not receive the same scrutiny as in the case of channeling via the financial sector, which is likely to affect its efficiency. For instance, although many steel companies have seen large increases in profitability due to high international prices, it may not be optimal to invest these profits in another steel factory. There is also anecdotal evidence of sub-optimal investment by Chinese companies in acquisitions or ventures in other sectors.
• These issues are of particular concern in an environment of low dividend payout and weak corporate governance.
As profitability of SOEs has risen, the distribution of their profits has become a particular issue of debate. Most of the state enterprises have not paid dividends to the shareholder for more than a decade, despite rising profits. This may have been appropriate in times of restructuring. However, to improve the allocation of public resources, transparency, and accountability, a dividend policy for SOEs needs to be developed. Since SASAC is representing the state as an owner, and is not a holding company, the dividends paid out should directly go to the budget. If new capital investments need to be made that require state funding, this should be done through a budget request submitted by SASAC on behalf of the state enterprises. SASAC could play a role in increasing transparency of the management of SOEs by issuing an annual report on the performance of the SOEs under their management. These measures could be supported by auditing of financial accounts by independent auditors to ensure appropriate dividend is paid out. Making the issuance of capital transfers more transparent would also be appropriate.
Strengthening corporate governance, moving to increasing dividend pay-out, and paying more scrutiny to the allocation of capital along these lines would improve the efficiency of capital and tend to shift the trade-off between consumption and investment more towards consumption.
2) Short and medium-term prospects and macroeconomic policy implications
The current investment to GDP ratio of 45 percent is considered higher than optimal by most observers. The high investment ratio is partly a cyclical phenomenon, and-given the importance of internal financing-investment growth can be expected to fall as profit growth is projected to decline, although by less than one to one. Nevertheless, the structural component of the investment to GDP ratio remains high, and not sustainable in light of long-term saving prospects (see below). The government has recently emphasized the need to improve the quality of growth and increase the role of consumption in the economy (as opposed to investment). In addition to the corporate governance and dividend related measures outlined above, what other measures would further these objectives?
• A shift in government spending from investment to spending on health and education ("from construction of physical infrastructure to social infrastructure") would directly reduce national saving and investment. The scope for such a shift is significant, given the high government savings. Expanding the social safety net is also considered by many to reduce private consumption.
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• Changes in the policy framework away from the promotion of capital-intensive industry towards labor intensive activities including services would increase the share of labor income in the economy, and thereby the average propensity to consume. This implies adjustments in policies on prices, the financial sector, land, the environment, and labor movement.
Investment has traditionally been correlated strongly with saving, leaving the savinginvestment balance-the external current account-small. To the extent that current trends towards an increasing current account surplus intensify and become problematic, real exchange rate appreciation would reduce the balance. Such an appreciation would reduce profits; it would also reduce investment, but by less than one to one.
3) Longer-term saving prospects and the impact of policy
Looking further ahead, in addition to the impact of possible policy adjustments as sketched above, several endogenous developments are likely to lead to lower overall saving and investment.
• An eventual moderation of economic growth and demographic changes-with relatively fewer workers-are likely to put significant downward pressure on household saving. Purely for illustration, using coefficients estimated by Modigliani and Cao, and judged by them to be "reasonable" (also in comparison with other studies), a slowdown in long-term GDP growth of 2 percentage points would lead to a decline in the household saving ratio of a whopping 5 percentage points. In addition, the projected increase in the "employment to minor" ratio from around 2.4 now to 2.25 (2.0) in 2030 (2075) would lead to an additional 1.5 (4.0) percentage point decline in the household saving ratio.
• Pension system reform may increase national saving, depending on the degree of funding in the eventual system and household's response to these policy changes. However, pension reform-related upward pressure is unlikely to compensate for the downward pressure coming from a growth slowdown and demographics.
• Further development of financial markets will reduce the number of credit constrained people and small enterprises, and the associated need for saving for anticipating purchases of consumer durables, life-cycle events (such as weddings), and investment. Source: NBS, and author's estimates (see annex for methodological notes).
1/ The observations for 2002 and 2003 are estimations (see annex). They are subject to significant uncertainty and may not necessarily be consistent with the "below the line" data on assets. Sources: For China, data from SYB, via CIEC database. For other countries, from OECD Economic Outlook. The original data for OECD countries on net income and net investment is transformed into gross equivalents by remo consumption of fixed capital--which is not known for China. 1/ Staff estimate: subject to substantial uncertainty. 2/ The total of financial and non-financial enterprises, to ensure comparability with other countries. In China, in 2001, net lending of the financial sector was -2.4 percent of GDP.
